Such expressions as that famous one of Linnæus, and which we often meet with in a more or less concealed form, that the characters do not make the genus, but that the genus gives the characters, seem to imply that something more is included in our classification, than mere resemblance. I believe that something more is included; and that propinquity of descent,—the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings,—is the bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is partially revealed to us by our classifications (Darwin, 1859, p. 413f).
Showing posts with label Explanations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Explanations. Show all posts

Tuesday, 28 April 2009

Biology & Teleology

ResearchBlogging.org

“Met the ghost of Stephen Foster at the Hotel Paradise
This is what I told him as I gazed into his eyes:
Rooms were made for carpets,
Towers made for spires,
Ships were made for cannonades to fire off from inside them ..."
(Squirrel Nut Zippers, 2002)


Findings of a recent study published in Cognition state that:
    "... college-educated adults display scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations with ease. Such findings highlight the challenges faced by educators in both the life and physical sciences. The source of popular resistance to scientific ideas appears to run deep" (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009: 143).
They certainly 'run deep' in biological systematics and in the philosophy of biology as a newly published article in the Journal of Biogeography by Heads (2009) clearly demonstrates.

According to Heads, Darwin's move away from teleological argumentation was rejected by neodarwinists who preferred purpose over structure:
    "... as his knowledge of biology and laws of growth deepened, Darwin learned to avoid teleology. Through this process he left his background behind and evolved into a modern (Renaissance) scientist. Nevertheless, Darwin's later work has been ignored whereas his earlier arguments have been co-opted as support for teleology, panselectionism and centre of originism." (Heads, 2009: Online)
Teleology and biology have been inseparable since Aristotle despite the attempts by Roger Bacon, Rene Descarte, Baruch Spinoza and Wolfgang von Goethe to undermine it completely. German idealists didn't help, neither did 19th century English naturalists, who like Kant sought to replace a theological or 'higher purpose' with Natural 'intention'.

Heads provides several excellent examples of natural teleology in systematic biology:
    "... many features of organisms are teleological, a bird's wings are for flying; eyes are for seeing ..." (Ayala, 2004:65).
    "A rock may not have a purpose but an eye does. Eyes and hands do not just happen for no reason" (Ruse, 2003:33).
Teleology, according to Heads, seems to be embraced by some philosophers of biology:
    "... a vitally important tool for looking into the organic world" (Ruse, 2002: 47).
The problem of teleology is rampant in systematics and biogeography, with few opposing it and others, like Ernst Mayr, using weak arguments:
    "[Mayr] recognized that the teleology in biology was a serious problem. His solution was to suggest that the modern synthesis is not really teleological, and that it uses teleological language but not teleological thinking" (Heads, 2009: Online).
I believe that Heads, like Kelemen & Rosset (2009), has pin-pointed the problem behind teleology, namely we start out as teleologists. Once we accept this fact, we have a lot of unlearning to do. I whole-heartily recommend Heads (2009) for students of systematics and biogeography.

Malte C. Ebach

References
Ayala, F.J. (2004) Design without designer: Darwin's greatest discovery. Debating design: from Darwin to DNA (ed. by W.A. Dembski and M. Ruse), pp. 55–80. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Heads, M. (2009). Darwin’s changing views on evolution: from centres of origin and teleology to vicariance and incomplete lineage sorting Journal of Biogeography DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2699.2009.02127.x
Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009). The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults Cognition, 111 (1), 138-143 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.001
Ruse, M. (2002) Evolutionary biology and teleological thinking. Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (ed. by A. Ariew, R. Cummins and M. Perlman), pp. 33–62. Oxford University Press, New York.

Friday, 4 January 2008

Explanations and Bad Science

Explanations are wonderful things. They provide the world around us with meaning, a way of reasoning with others and a path to understanding scientific processes. Explanations may also sow the seeds of bad science.

Bad Science can be interpreted in a number of ways. The media and “science” journalists interpret “bad” science to mean anti-science or “science” conducted by non-scientists, based on results that are corrupted, forged or spurious. We believe however that bad science is nothing more than “made-up-ology”, which is created by scientists in order to make highly speculative claims to explain natural phenomena. Strangely the media never pick up on our version of bad science, possibly because “science” journalists are there to report positively about science rather than to criticize scientific explanations.

Anyone with enough qualification to report on scientific endeavor has the ability to see through spurious claims, reconstructions or theories. Dinosaur reconstructions based on a single jaw fragments for instance, rate highly in our list of bad science. There are limits to reconstructions, many of which never see the light of day in scientific journals but feature on the cover of “scientific” magazines. The aim of such reconstructions apparently are to to communicate a predicted past event, such a meteorite impact, to a popular audience. The idea is analogous to comparing a period-dress Hollywood blockbuster to an actual historical event. The event most likely occurred, but since it was not recorded in detail nor witness by anyone living, still remains unknown. Discovering a dinosaur jaw or even complete skull does not mean we can determine its size or colour; reconstructions and films based on “true events”, the actual machinations, are fictitious. Reconstructions however are powerful ways to explain important events.

The Power of Explanation

Explanations are mechanical devices with which to predict or retrodict future or past events and processes that are unobservable. Most important is that explanations rely on discoveries.

In experimental science, such as chemistry, phenomena are observable and repeatable. We may discover for instance that two chemicals added together produce another. The event can be repeated, described and observed, therefore resulting in an explanation of the processes involved. Non-experimental sciences such as palaeontology however rely on retrodictions based on evidence to hand. The discovery of a fossil jaw bone for example, is limited to description and observation of its form. The processes that the jaw bone underwent when it was part of a living creature are unobservable and not repeatable. The resulting explanations are quite different from those in chemistry as they are based on assumptions, theories, hypotheses and comparisons. In palaeontology we choose the best explanation based on the most convincing and rational argument. That argument is tied to accepted theories and hypotheses at the time meaning that explanations are forever changing and ephemeral. This does not mean that non-experimental sciences like palaeontology are bad or non-scientific. Many scientific fields that involve the study of past events are far more reliant on patterns than the experimental sciences (i.e., ecology, systematics, biogeography, geology, geography). Explanation, it seems, provides greater meaning.

The non-experimental sciences are primarily descriptive and comparative, relying on form and its relationship rather than on explanations. Given that normal processes are taken for granted in the experimental sciences (i.e. photosynthesis, digestion, ontogeny etc.), they are not evident in the non-experimental fields. Without the luxury of observing processes, scientists are reduced to making up hypothetical explanations in order to provide some kind of meaning. This is understandable in a world where explanations are seen to be more meaningful that form. For us form, its description and comparison, is meaningful. The discovery of patterns and relationships between form is possibly the most powerful scientific endevour. Without it we live in the present with no knowledge of the past. Many scientists within palaeontology, geology, systematics and biogeography feel that the discovery of relationship is not enough. The rise of hypothetical mechanical explanations as “meaningful” is where we believe bad science to begin.